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BOOK REVIEW
TOWARD CANTANKEROUS COMMUNITY: A Review of THE
ROOSTER'S EGG: ON THE PERSISTENCE OF PREJUDICE, by Patricia
J. Williams, Harvard University Press, 1995
CYNTHIA V. WARD*
In her book Tell My Horse, Zora Neale Hurston describes
Jamaica as "the land where the rooster lays an egg."' Hurston's
startling image illustrates the effect of racist societal norms on
Jamaican children born to white men and black women:
[T]he black mother is literally and figuratively kept out of
sight as far as possible, but no one is allowed to forget that
white father, however questionable the circumstances of birth.
You hear about uMy father this, and my father that, and my
father who was English, you know," until you get the
impression that he or she had no mother. Black skin is so
utterly condemned that the black mother is not going to be
mentioned or exhibited. You get the impression that these
virile Englishmen do not require women to reproduce. They
just come out to Jamaica, scratch out a nest and lay eggs
that hatch out into "pink" Jamaicans. 2
This excerpt supplies the title of Patricia Williams's new book
and succinctly encapsulates its four major themes. First,
Hurston's account demonstrates the power of racism not only to
disparage persons of a race deemed inferior, but actually to
render them invisible, thereby artificially inflating the importance
and influence of the dominant racial group and draining the
"mainstream" culture of diversity it would necessarily possess if
all persons were viewed and treated as equals. In a racist
society, the dominant group does not merely fail to acknowledge
the contributions of outsiders; it treats those contributions as part
of the unformed, inanimate "natural" world over which
domination is felt to be both necessary and appropriate.
Second, Hurston's essay implicitly names the social sphere as
distinguished from that of politics and law, as the site of the most
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University.
1. ZORA NEALE HuRsTON, TELL MY HORSE (1938), reprinted in I LOVE MYSELF WHEN
I AM LAUGHING... AND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING MEAN AND IMPRESSIVE 125 (1979).
2. Id. at 127.
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stubborn and intransigent racism. Professor Williams takes up
this theme more explicitly, drawing on common experience to
point out how tenacious of life, how much a part of the daily
existence of each and all of us, are our own racial identities and
those of others. We cannot change that, Williams suggests,
merely by passing laws. Fundamental change will not happen
until we all recognize the persisting strength of the racial walls
between groups and agree relentlessly to cultivate the ability to
talk (and listen!) to each other through those walls.
Third, the Hurston story registers the destructive internal
impact of racist social norms within subordinated groups. In the
story, children born to parents of different races themselves
participate in erasing their black mothers from their public lives.
The story suggests that norms constructed out of hatred create
self-hatred in individuals.
Finally, Hurston's account of Jamaica touches lightly on the
difficult issues surrounding the relationship between race and
gender, which have been the focus of much recent jurisprudential
work by Professor Williams and others. 3  Hurston discusses
racism in a specifically gendered context, one in which the
powerful racial figure, the figure that is socially endorsed and is
thus made to appear capable of nature-transcending miracles, is
both white and male, and is thereby a participant in two
overlapping but distinct spheres of tradition-based social
dominance.
With the directness and originality that always characterize
her work, Patricia Williams traces these four themes in American
experience. 4 Among the most respected legal scholars who work
in the narrative style, Williams uses personal stories to reinforce
her substantive emphasis on the importance of attending to
context in legal and political discussion; on the impossibility of
maintaining community without first acknowledging difference;'
and on the inescapable influence of everyday social experience in
creating and reinforcing theoretical ideas. Deliberately
contradicting the impression of disembodied abstraction often
conveyed by the work of theoretical scholars, Williams invites her
readers to peer through her kitchen window where we see her
3. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY
OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
4. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG (1995).
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squeezing Lemon Joy into a wine glass while listening to Howard
Stern - an experience that becomes the basis for the book's third
chapter, "Radio Hoods," in which she discusses the meaning and
influence of radio talk shows. In Chapter Eleven,5 "Black-Power
Dream Barbie," she shares an experience at a dance class where,
surrounded by a group of Japanese students who hip-hopped rings
around her, she ruminates on the nature of cultural property and
its complex connections to race. And her twelfth chapter, "In
Search of Pharaoh's Daughter," takes us through the sometimes
hilarious but also heartrending process of filling out an adoption
agency questionnaire that unintentionally, but quite definitely,
treats children like "the multiple combinations of meat offered at
... Kentucky Fried Chicken."6
These personal stories, and many others, are chosen to make
key points in Williams's argument and to illustrate her general
belief in the importance of keeping real life in view while talking
theory. And throughout The Rooster's Egg, Williams's personal
stories weave a thread of optimism through her discussion of the
difficulties of transcending bigotry to reach true, difference-
respecting community.
I. THE CONTINUING POWER OF RACE AND GENDER
"Witch-hunting misogyny is fiercely recurrent in this nation,"
Professor Williams declares in Chapter One. "Aimed particularly
at black women, single women, and poor women on welfare, the
attacks have handily condensed all three categories into the
encompassing figure of 'the' black single mother on welfare."7
Williams attacks the now-popular view that the current structure
of welfare, especially Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), encourages poor women to have children when they
otherwise would not. Williams believes that this view targets
both poor children and their mothers for social denigration.
Indeed,
The war on illegitimacy is . . . a way of drawing lines
between children who are thought legitimate and those who
are not. In terms of its civic consequences, it builds a barrier
5. Professor Williams does not number the chapters.
6. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 219.
7. Id. at 4.
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between legal and illegal children, between those who are all
in the family and those who are deemed alien.8
This is not simply an empirical debate, for Williams does not
only dispute the idea that AFDC, in fact, encourages poor women
to have more children. She goes further, suggesting that the "war
on welfare" is both motivated and perpetuated by racism and
sexism.9 Of course, if the structure of welfare does in fact result
in poor women having more children than they would otherwise,
and these children do in fact grow up in poverty, then the
motivations of those who attack AFDC might seem irrelevant.
Professor Williams's larger point, however, concerns not the
welfare issue in particular, but rather the general tone of contem-
porary political debate. Not only with respect to welfare, but also
on a host of other issues, Williams sees a rise in the level of
mean-spirited attacks on America's most vulnerable citizens.
She pursues this concern even more openly in Chapter Three,
"Radio Hoods," in which she worries that "[i]n the four years since
Clarence Thomas has assumed his post on the Supreme Court,
crude, in-your-face racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia
have become commonplace, popularly expressed, and louder in
volume than at any time since the beginning of the civil rights
movement."10 Part of Williams's evidence for this belief is the
prevalence of conservative talk shows, such as those of Howard
Stern and Rush Limbaugh, and the large size of their mostly
white male audiences who call in to attack affirmative action and
other achievements of the Civil Rights Movement." Williams
8. Id. at 8-9.
9. For example Professor Williams states:
Our present welfare war is pervaded with the assumption that black women
have no business having any more children (its most common expression
being the fiction, again, that women on welfare are having more children just
to get more money) .... Yet this anxiety about population control does not
seem to extend to middle-class whites .. . or to poor white women who have
children out of wedlock, who are encouraged to give up their children for
adoption and redistribution in the great "white baby shortage."
Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 44.
11. Williams discusses the "crude demagoguery" of talk shows that makes her:
feel more and more surrounded by megawatted expressions of hate and
discrimination - the coded epithets, the mocking angry glee, the endless
tirades filled with nonspecific, nonempirically based slurs against "these
people" or "those minorities" or "feminazis" or "liberals" . . . . American
popular culture has suddenly been given a megadose of childish turnaround
laced with a very adult kind of verbal brutality.
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worries that the bigotry expressed by the callers on these shows
evinces a new social permission to publicly embrace racism,
sexism, and other forms of group-based hatred, and that First
Amendment protections insidiously cloak the purveyors of such
hatred with respectability. 12  She takes such bigotry to be
evidence of
the reemergence, more powerful than at any time since the
founding of the Ku Klux Klan and the institution of Jim
Crow, of a socio-centered self that excludes "the likes of"
[disadvantaged groups] from the civic circle, and that would
rob [such groups] of [their] worth and claim and identity as
... citizen[s].13
Not that racism and sexism have ever been absent from the
American scene. Indeed, claims Professor Williams, "[d]espite the
enormous social, political, and legal fluctuations of twentieth-
century American life, there has been a remarkable stasis in race
relations, an intractability of gender hierarchy, an entrenched
power dynamic that has resisted the reordering of the very best
rhetoricians and theoreticians.' 4 For Williams, the basis for
racial oppression is no longer overt use of the law to enforce
racial inequality; instead, such oppression is perpetuated via the
language of freedom and privatization:
No longer are state troops used to block entry to schools and
other public institutions-segregation's strong arm, states'
rights, has found a new home in an economic gestalt that has
simply privatized everything . . . . No longer is the law
expressly discriminatory [as to race and ethnicity] . . . yet
the phenomenon of laissez-faire exclusion has resulted in as
complete a pattern of economic and residential segregation as
has ever existed in this country.15
That statement is extreme - perhaps too extreme.' 6  But for
Williams, this privatization phenomenon underlies a progressive
dehumanization in our public discourse that shoves continued
racial oppression under the protective covering offered by private
freedoms, most prominently economic freedom and freedom of
12. See, e.g., id. at 51.
13. Id. at 51.
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 25.
16. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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speech. In a gripping illustration that immediately brings to
mind the battles over lunch-counter segregation during the
Sixties, Williams discusses the current phenomenon of "Rush
Rooms" in restaurants around the nation, where Rush Limbaugh
fans come to:
surrender to the naughty luxury of a room in which a Ku
Klux Klan meeting could take place in orderly, First
Amendment fashion .... Everyone's "free" to come in [to
these rooms] ... , but mostly the undesirable nonconformist
non-dittoheads are gently repulsed away. It's a high-tech
world of enhanced choice, you see. Whites choose mostly to
sit in the Rush room; feminists, blacks, and gays "choose" to
sit elsewhere. No need to buy black votes, you just pay
blacks not to vote; no need to insist on white-only schools,
you just sell them on the desirability of black-only schools.
No need for signs and police to enforce the separation of gay
from straight; non conformist troublemakers will herd
themselves nicely in the face of a din 'of racist, sexist,
homophobic babble. Just sit back and watch it work, like
those invisible shock shields that keep dogs cowering in their
own backyards. 17
Just as segregation laws erected barriers between the races, so
does protected racist speech. And this type of speech, which for
decades had been ashamed enough of itself to stay out of the
limelight, is now charging back onto center-stage, literally with
a vengeance.18
Williams argues that racist stereotypes are also reinforced via
economic freedoms. Just as free speech protections in a racist
society can perpetuate racial dominance of minorities, so can
private market forces reinforce negative racial stereotypes. By
way of illustration, she recalls seeing a bin full of mother and
father dolls in a store. The dolls were identically crafted except
that some, the higher-priced ones, were white, while the lower-
priced ones, priced for "sacrificial sale", were black. Williams
points out that from a color-blind perspective this pricing scheme
was simply irrational; it becomes understandable only when racial
prejudice is factored in. The lower market demand for the black
dolls, reflected in their lower price, must proceed from a
17. Id. at 53-54.
18. See, e.g., id. at 49 (quoting former Secretary of Education William Bennett for the
statement: "People were afraid of censure by gay activists, feminists, environmentalists
- now they are not because Rush takes them on.").
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difference perceived by potential purchasers between these dolls
and the white dolls. Black dolls are valued less, and that lower
value results from consumer views about race.
Williams offers a more dramatic example of the market's
unconscious mirroring of societal racism in her twelfth chapter,
"In Search of Pharaoh's Daughter." Here she discusses the
"market valuation of children,"19 in part by sharing her own
experience as an adopting parent. Having adopted her son,
Williams received a call from the agency asking her which fee
schedule she had selected, the "standard" or the "special."2° It
turned out that the "standard" fee schedule was higher than the
"special," in that the latter applied to "older, black, and other
handicapped children," and that it was set at a lower level in
order to encourage the adoption of "less requested" children,
including black children.2' At the very least, this illustration
demonstrates the importance of race in the minds of parents; the
fact that the race of their prospective child typically matters to
adoptive parents, and that most such parents prefer a child of the
white race, is itself a statement about the power of racial
categories.22
Williams traces this phenomenon to the continuing power of
racial categories that restrict the ability of a black person to
"exist as a real human being in the cage of those too-easy
assumptions" about personhood that are drawn from race.23 Race
and class coding are two important ways in which the
individuality, authenticity, and basic personhood of blacks are
denied in this society.24 Such coding provides the basis not only
for negative views of blacks, but also for white denial of black
additions to the "mainstream" culture, the unthinking absorption
into the white mainstream, for example, of black contributions to
American dance and music, while the history and source of those
contributions are erased from our collective memory.25 Blacks are
19. Id. at 217.
20. Id. at 222.
21. Id. at 223.
22. Williams seems to go even further. Describing her reaction to being told about the
.special" price schedule, she writes:
Suddenly what had been a price system based on services rendered became
clearly, sickeningly, a price system for 'goods,' a sale for chattel, linked not
to services but to the imagined quality of 'things' exchanged .... [I]n our
shopping-mall world it had all the earmarks of a two-for-one sale.
Id.
23. Id. at 59.
24. See id. at 58-73.
25. See, e.g., id. at 84-85.
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thus given the message that assimilation into "mainstream"
society, or at least inclusion in its spheres of power, can come
only at the price of self-erasure.
Williams discusses the impact on blacks of "mainstream"
devaluation of their personhood and their creativity.
Encountering a young black girl with her mother in the subway,
Williams takes note of the child's "Barbie" hat and wonders: "Is
Barbie, that anorexic instrument of white women's oppression,
capable of being black?"26 Recalling the choices about the ideal
female image which went into the original (white) Barbie, she
wonders about the transmitted effect of that ideal, which includes
the ideal of whiteness, on black girls .2  Regretting the "striking
absence" of positive role images of black women today,28 Williams
recalls the black children in Kenneth Clark's famous study, who
preferred white dolls to black ones,2 and she sees continuing
racial self-denial in Michael Jackson's apparent attempts to erase
his blackness; 3° in the self-rejection of a man born to a
Vietnamese mother and an African American father, who
confesses his shame at having a black father and wishes he were
a white Amerasian;3' and in an American black woman who chose
to be implanted with the egg of a white woman and to have a
white child so that her child would be "spared the misery of
racism."32
Williams notes that when affirmative action is taken to
recognize socially inflicted harms to blacks, such efforts are seen
to victimize whites.3 How quick we are to see ourselves as
victims, Williams reminds us, and how slow to see ourselves as
oppressors. The view that affirmative action programs favor the
undeserving draws upon images of blacks as inferior that predate
affirmative action, and, Williams theorizes, "will probably outlast"
it. 34
Throughout her wide-ranging discourse about race, Williams
never loses sight of other dimensions of social injustice, especially
26. Id. at 183.
27. See id. ('It's pathetic enough that little white girls yearn so for the conical breasts
and vaulted arches of a trophy-wife-in-training; but when little black girls don blond wigs
and spike heels they pass home and go all the way to straight-out prostitution.").
28. Id. at 184-85.
29. See id. at 184.
30. See, e.g., id. at 226, 242.
31. See id. at 225.
32. Id. at 240.
33. See id. at 88-108.
34. Id. at 104-05.
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that of gender. In Chapter Eight, "A Hearing of One's Own," she
invokes the case of Lani Guinier, the African American law
professor who was nominated by President Clinton to serve as
director of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department,
and then un-nominated following a media furor over her views on
affirmative action and the legislative representation of blacks. 35
Williams writes that Guinier's voice, the voice of a highly
educated, articulate, and experienced black woman, was
"completely ... obliterated at that moment in history when she
came close to assuming a position invested with the power of
law."36 Williams also takes note of the ongoing political assault
on Hillary Rodham Clinton, whose professional accomplishments,
independent status, and feminist views have attracted vituperous
attacks from a wide range of sources.37 "Three centuries after
Salem," challenges Professor Williams, "[w]hy are we still burning
witches, or even just low-simmering them to death?"38
Williams condemns the revival of the most traditional,
oppressive ideas of womanhood through the contemporary concern
prevalent in conservative circles about "family values" and
"preserving the family" - concerns that often take as a root
premise the notion that women belong at home and not in the
professional workplace. Hillary Rodham Clinton, who alone
among America's first ladies has rejected this vision, has been
compared unfavorably by Republicans to Barbara Bush and
Marilyn Quayle, both defenders of women's traditional role as
wives and mothers. 39 Mrs. Clinton, and by implication all women
who defy the home and hearth stereotype, run the risk of public
scorn for being too "masculine" (or, in a related attack, for being
lesbian) even as the masculine world of work refuses to accept
them on any other terms but its own.4° These attacks also
involve President Clinton, for Hillary Clinton cannot be strong
unless her husband is weak. Bill Clinton is therefore vilified for
not being able to "control his woman."4 1 Again, Williams urges a
shift by men from automatic defensiveness ("I can't even say hello
35. See id. at 138-49.
36. Id. at 139.
37. See id. at 151-68.
38. Id. at 153.
39. See id. at 160-62.
40. See id. at 160-65 (discussing the assault on the women's movement by
.assimilationist models of civil belonging," and the prevalence of attacks on the sexuality
of feminist women).
41. Id. at 161-62.
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to a female coworker without being accused of sexual
harassment!") to genuine engagement with women's concerns. 42
II. ON TALKING, AND LISTENING, THROUGH WALLS
Thus, Williams emphasizes the limitations of the First
Amendment while simultaneously celebrating the possibilities of
open dialogue. She wonders,
how to relegitimate the national discussion of racial, ethnic,
and gender tensions so that we can get past the Catch-22 in
which merely talking about it is considered an act of war, in
which not talking about it is complete capitulation to the
status quo, and in which not talking about it is repeatedly
covered up with a lot of high-volume substitute talk about the
legalities of censorship and the First Amendment.43
As Williams reminds us, the First Amendment does not turn
protected speech into virtuous speech; we should not draw from
the statement, "this speech is protected by the First Amendment,"
the conclusion that 'this speech is true, or moral, or good."44 The
First Amendment offers an essentially negative protection; it
prevents the state from banning most speech. This protection
should never end an important political argument, argues
Williams, but should instead prompt "more constructive
conversations about how we might reinfuse our pedagogy with
dignity and tolerance for all."45  Professor Williams urges that
such conversations cannot be free and fair if already burdened
groups are forced to initiate and conduct them. In the academic
setting, for example, Williams argues against the idea that
institutional interference in the speech of campus community
42. Id. at 166.
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 291 Williams expresses concern that the "noisy rush to discuss the legalities
of censorship and the First Amendment preempts such conversations." She states:
it is as if the First Amendment has become severed from any discussion of
the actual limits and effects of political, commercial, defamatory, perjurious,
or any other of the myriad classifications of speech. It is as if expressions
that carry a particularly volatile payload of hate become automatically
privileged... as a bludgeon of paradox - "I have my First Amendment right
to call you a monkey, so you shut up about it." As the legal anthropologist
Richard Perry observes, hatred thereby gets to cross-dress as Virtue
Aggrieved.
CANTANKEROUS COMMUNITY
members is always wrong. This laissez-faire approach, she
writes, "makes only certain students - those who are most
frequently the objects of harassment - the perpetual teachers, not
merely of their histories, but of their very right to be students.
This is an immense burden, a mountainous presumption of
noninclusion that must be constantly addressed and overcome."
46
Williams's call for "empathic relation" - for sensitive, and
difference-respecting, talking and listening - lies at the core of
her hopes for true national community.47 It is a pragmatic vision
of community, as such visions go. Although she (somewhat
ruefully) identifies herself as a "communitarian moralist,"48
Williams advises that "simple cantankerous coexistence may be
what we should be aiming for in a democracy based on live-and-
let-live."49
But the achievement of even this pared down goal, she
writes, requires that we improve our ability to talk to each other.
In this regard, Williams worries about the denigration of the
language of civil rights, not merely from conservatives in the form
of attacks on "political correctness," but also from some who seek
to advance the agenda of minorities. Thus, while she regrets that
the term "multiculturalism" has been drummed out of polite
discourse by the critics of political correctness, 5° she also bewails
the transformation of the concept of racial integration into an evil
and the growing support for resegregation among minority rights
advocates."1
If discourse is the way to reform, then communication, and
particularly the use and abuse of language, becomes centrally
important. Williams blames the mass media, especially the
electronic media, for affirmatively failing to shape the important
political debates of our day. "While it is probably true that the
media is a reflection of America in general," she writes,
I resist the temptation to say that they are just a mirror.
From Churchill to Hitler to the old Soviet Union, it is quite
clear that radio and television have the power to change the
course of history, have the power to proselytize and to
46. Id. at 39.
47. Id. at 39.
48. Id. at 180.
49. Id. at 192.
50. Id. at 27.
51. See id. at 25.
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coalesce not merely the good and the noble but also the very
worst in human nature.52
She repeatedly calls on the mass media to promote dignified
discussion (rather than mindless fueding) about real issues.5 3
This is not a new idea, but it does highlight Williams's larger
point - that what counts is not what the law says, but how we
view, and talk to, each other. The First Amendment can serve
either as a vehicle for the public infliction of hateful speech on
despised others, or as a vehicle for reaching out and
communicating in an atmosphere of respect. When we personally
are not willing to include and equalize, the law cannot do it for
US.
Williams sees the power of the electronic media as
"enormous,"54 and she calls on the media to use that power to
further a "long-overdue" national dialogue on the issues of race,
gender, and class which continue to divide Americans. 55  To
escape the "cultural anorexia" which now encourages us to assault
our bodies and submit our imaginations in the service of socially
generated norms that exclude those who are different,6 we must
begin by recognizing and respecting our differences, and we must
then use our ability to communicate to reach common
understandings which transcend difference.
Professor Williams delivers her message in realistic terms
that notice the blemishes even on its heroes,5 7 that do not turn
away from the limitations even of its messenger,58 but that
simultaneously remain hopeful that honest communication is
enough to produce difference-respecting community. She often
bends over backward to understand those whose views she
disputes. 59 This effort gives integrity to her claims that human
beings cannot be reduced to abstract principles but must be seen
in all their varieties of virtue and vice,6° and that a person's
52. Id. at 45.
53. See, e.g., id. at 75-76.
54. Id. at 110.
55. Id. at 122.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., id., in the chapter entitled "Clarence X," at 121-36.
58. See, e.g., id. at 198-99 (recounting author's own painful lesson on the power of
racial categories).
59. See, e.g., id. at 73-74 (arguing that the media's bigoted depiction of poor whites
offers insight into that group's hostility toward blacks).
60. See, e.g., id. at 121-36 (discussing heroes in general, and Malcolm X in particular).
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concept of justice is inevitably influenced by his or her own
socialization and experience. 61
On the other hand, Williams's stories do sometimes lapse into
political clich6. She quite forcefully argues that "[wie must get
beyond the stage of halting conversations filled with the
superficialities of hurt feelings and those 'my maid says blacks
are happy' or 'whites are devils' moments."62 But too often she
does not move beyond this stage herself, depicting whites as
idiotic cartoon characters63 and arguing that the injustices
suffered by minorities and women are as bad today as they have
ever been.64 No one would deny that racism and sexism are still
with us; but to suggest that the situation of American blacks
today is one of slavery, or that American women are as
downtrodden in 1997 as they were a century ago, is to strain
credulity past the breaking point.
61. Recounting her early job in a Los Angeles prosecutor's office dominated by white
males, Williams remembers:
[Llistening to some of the more senior prosecutors shoot the breeze. They
were talking about a case whose charge one of them had just reduced to a
misdemeanor. It was a child-molestation case, involving an eleven-year-old
girl whose stepfather was the defendant. They were looking at a photo of the
little girl and in the most crude and unselfconscious terms they were
admiring the state of her physical development - who could blame the
stepfather, they said. They decided they'd never convince a jury to convict,
so what the hey.
Id. at 92.
62. Id. at 24.
63. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (a white man boards a subway, points disdainfully at an elderly
black woman asleep in the train, and loudly informs a twelve year-old black passenger,
"You see that? That's why you'd better learn how to work!"); id. at 66-67 (a white
supervisor of two minority employees rolls his eyes at Williams and "sigh[s] in all apparent
seriousness, 'It's so hard to find good help these days.'"); id. at 84-85 (citing as an example
of white cultural power "the young white person who, having attended her first African
dance class, announced that it was 'nice to see how many moves they've borrowed from
aerobics.'").
64. See, e.g., id. at 16 ("[d]espite the enormous social, political, and legal fluctuations
of twentieth-century American life, there has been a remarkable stasis in race relations,
an intractability of gender hierarchy, an entrenched power dynamic that has resisted the
reordering of the very best rhetoricians. . ."); id. at 16-17 (discussing focus on markets and
freedom as rationale for modem slavery); id. at 25 ("the phenomenon of laissez-faire
exclusion has resulted in as complete a pattern of economic and residential segregation as
has ever existed in this country."); id. at 230 ("[t]he transformation of slavery's rationales
from one discourse to another has been ... an extraordinary force in the shaping of the
modern world"). In contrast, Williams states:
We have accomplished much in the last twenty or thirty years that is too
easily forgotten. As the reality of Asian-American police officers, women
firefighters, close-captioned TV, and a Caribbean-American general named
Colin Powell fade in the backdrop of the "normal," we lose sight of how
recent, costly, and precarious this much inclusion has really been.
Id. at 94-95.
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Such glitches detract unnecessarily from the force of
Williams's main argument. One assumes she would be the first
to acknowledge that difference-respecting dialogue requires, at a
minimum, that we all bring to the discussion at least a
reasonable degree of interpretive charity. This appears, in fact,
to be Williams's fundamental belief which makes her own
occasional digressions from it regrettable, rather than fatal, to her
core argument.
III. THE STUBBORNNESS OF BIGOTRY
Throughout The Rooster's Egg, Patricia Williams condemns
the repeated attempts in American history to depict race and
gender-based hierarchy as "natural," rather than socially
constructed. She notes that "as women are still trying to
overcome presumptions that they really like getting fondled in the
back office, blacks are trying to overcome presumptions that they
really deserve to be on the bottom of the heap."6 One
consequence of these deeply entrenched views is the repeated
rebirth, albeit in a new guise, of the view that minorities and
women are inherently inferior in ways which are relevant to law
and politics. With respect to racial minorities, Williams discusses
the latest incarnation of this phenomenon via attacks on the
"black single welfare mother" and on the qualifications of black
people in the workplace. Such attacks, she charges, have been
purified into authoritative "scientific" propositions by charts,
numbers, and economic modeling. Behaviors that are the product,
at least in significant part, of rigid social stereotypes and role
expectations, are sterilized via quantification and presented as
static "preferences" whose proper theater of operation is the "free
market." Williams points out that this purification process misses
the underpinnings of certain valuations that inform those life-
paths purporting to be choices - valuations that I think are
too often nothing more and nothing newer than medieval
obsessions, a kind of obsessive eugenics. Perhaps it is only
in their mysterious contradictory power over us that these
valuations can be seen as the real irrationality in our lives -
almost religious beliefs and even hatreds, rather than "simply
economic" or "observably scientific" taxonomies.6
65. Id. at 26.
66. Id. at 233.
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From the feminist perspective, Williams's point receives
strong and sobering support from the growing popularity in
political and legal debate over the evolutionary perspective on
gender difference. The success of Robert Wright's book The Moral
Animal,6 7 which deploys evolutionary theory to explain a broad
range of human behavior, from male sexual aggressiveness to the
development of morality, from homosexuality to status-
consciousness, and from friendship to family organization, may
have brought to general public consciousness the growing appeal
of evolutionism in a wide variety of fields, including not only
biology but also psychology, sociology, anthropology, and law.6
Neo-Darwinists draw on evolutionary theory to argue the
"naturalness" of male sexual aggression, of domestic violence
against women, of women's role as nurturers, and of men's
allegedly superior ability to perform in the public sphere.l 9  For
example, evolutionary analysis suggests that men are biologically
wired to place primary emphasis on good looks and sexual
"coyness" in women,70 to pursue women aggressively for the
purpose of sex,7 and to lie to women about their availability for
67. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY
LIFE (1994).
68. See id. at 4 (discussing the growing importance of evolutionary psychology in
variety of fields); Wright states:
Can a Darwinian understanding of human nature help people reach their
goals in life? Indeed, can it help them choose their goals? Can it help
distinguish between practical and impractical goals? More profoundly, can it
help in deciding which goals are worthy? That is, does knowing how
evolution has shaped our basic moral impulses help us decide which impulses
we should consider legitimate?
The answers, in my opinion, are: yes, yes, yes, yes, and, finally, yes.
Id. at 10.
69. See generally DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN
MATING (1994) (describing the mating strategies of females and males); TIMOTHY
GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS. OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN
EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR (1991) (examining the lower parental investment of females in
comparison to males); MELVIN KONNER, THE TANGLED WING: BIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS ON
THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1982) (discussing males as the primary aggressor through out different
cultures); WRIGHT, supra note 67 (examining males' heightened concern of sexual infidelity
in comparison to females heightened concern of emotional fidelity); Robert Wright,
Feminists, Meet Mr. Darwin, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 28, 1994, at 34 (arguing men are
naturally more aggressive in regard to sexuality and power because of their biological,
evolutionary nature).
70. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 69, at 49-58; WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 64-86.
71. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 55-86; Barbara Smuts, Male Aggression
Against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective, 3 HUMAN NATURE 1 (1992). Thornhill &
Thornhill, The Evolutionary Psychology of Men's Coercive Sexuality, 15 BEHAVIORAL &
BRAIN SCIENCES 363 (1992).
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commitment to a relationship in order to get sex. 72 In addition,
men naturally feel possessive about women and are naturally
inclined physically to assault them if they suspect sexual
infidelity.73 Evolutionists depict women, on the other hand, as
"naturally" attracted to men of high social status, men with
money or other forms of social power, and assert that this
preference of women is what drives men to be competitive with
each other in the marketplace and makes them more successful
at such competition than women,74 who they describe as
biologically programmed to value home and family, and
specifically the nurturing of children, more than competitive
success in the public sphere. 75
Evolutionists acknowledge that they have no absolute proof
of these allegedly "natural" inclinations - that there is no such
thing, for example, as a "nurturance" gene or a "ladder-climbing"
gene. They base their conclusions about gender difference (and
many other patterns of human behavior) on the premises of
natural selection theory.76 In our "ancestral environment," which
they uniformly assume to be some type of hunter-gatherer society,
men and women responded to different environmental and social
stimuli by evolving into creatures that differ psychologically. 77
For each individual human, the name of the evolutionary game
is presumed to be passing one's genes on to future generations. 7
Men and women, posit evolutionists, are differently situated with
respect to this goal; while men are physically capable of siring
thousands of children, women are physically capable of bearing a
substantially fewer number. 79
72. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 55-86.
73. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 42 (stating that "[t]he male tendency to
'possessively' guard mates against the advances of rivals may be more than mere
metaphor. For men, 'the same mental algorithms are apparently activated in the marital
and mercantile spheres'") (citation omitted). See generally Smuts, supra note 72 (analyzing
several hypotheses which explain cross-cultural variation in the frequency of male
aggression against females using a comparative, evolutionary perspective); Thornhill &
Thornhill, supra note 72 (arguing sexual coercion by males could either arise from rape-
specific psychological adaptation of from more general psychological adaptation not directly
related to rape).
74. See, Wrightsupra note 69 at 34, 45.
75. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A
Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 971, 985-1016
(1995).
76. For a more fully detailed explanation of natural selection theory, see generally
supra note 69.
77. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 69, at 42.
78. See id. at 34.
79. See id. at 35.
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In contemporary evolutionist lingo, women's level of
"parental investment" in their offspring, even if one counts only
the period between conception and birth, is necessarily much
larger than that of men.80 This biological fact has purportedly
resulted in the evolution of profound psychological differences
between men and women, based on their necessarily varying
approaches to achieving passage of their genes.8 1  Men are
naturally inclined to seek out more sexual partners and to treat
sex more casually, because for them the necessary level of
investment in doing so is quite small, just the few minutes it
takes to achieve conception.82 Women, on the other hand, became
(relatively) reserved in sexual matters, because their necessarily
higher level of investment in each child has given them a
powerful incentive to ensure that each conceived child has the
best available genes, and, if possible, that each sexual partner
will be around to help protect and care for the child,8 3 thereby
assisting in the child's own survival and reproduction.
Thus, men are sexually aggressive, while women are sexually
coy. Men focus on looks (or, more particularly, on youth) in a
woman, while women focus on status (or, more specifically, wealth
and power that can be used to care for her and her offspring) in
a man. Finally, women are "naturally" inclined to stay home
with the kids, and are therefore destined, as a group, to be less
successful than men in the public sphere. Could one imagine a
more complete picture of the stereotypically "feminine"?
At least some neo-Darwinists believe that the evolutionary
explanation of gender difference has important implications for
law. For example, a recent article by law professor Kingsley
Browne disputes, on evolutionary grounds, the feminist view that
gender discrimination is the primary cause of the "glass ceiling,"
women's underrepresentation in upper management jobs and of
the continuing gender gap in wages.84 Professor Browne avers
that the glass ceiling and the gender gap have resulted not only
from male abuse of power, or "a superordination of male values
concerning work-force commitment"8 5 as feminists would charge,




83. See id. at 35.
84. See Browne, supra note 75, at 971.
85. Id. at 978.
86. See id.
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applying the evolutionist conception of gender difference, Browne
argues that women as a group are less inclined than men to take
risks, to seek status and power in the marketplace, and to be
competitively aggressive, while they are more likely than men to
value nurturing relationships with children and a family.87
According to Browne's view, therefore, differences in achievement
and pay between men and women are not necessarily evidence of
employer misconduct, but are in significant part the "natural"
result of different, but uncoerced, choices made by men and
women.88 Again, this gender gap in preferences is the product not
only of socially enforced inequality, but also of "real," "true," and
"fundamental" differences.3 Furthermore, alleges Browne, all the
feminist fuss over the gender gap in wages ignores the
disadvantages of men's natural proclivities for example, the fact
that men's disproportionate presence in the riskier jobs results in
more male occupational deaths.90 Browne asserts that current
employment discrimination law, which in some circumstances
allows evidence of women's statistical under representation in a
particular job to create a rebuttable presumption of employer
discrimination, should be revamped. Because the statistical
underrepresentation of women in top jobs is the result not only
of employer discrimination but also of "real," "true," and
"fundamental" differences between men and women, employers
should not be forced to bear the entire burden of equalizing the
numbers of women in the workforce or the pay they receive, if
indeed, that burden should be taken on at all. He concludes that
statistical proof alone should never constitute dispositive evidence
of employer discrimination.91
87. Id. at 1016-36.
88. See id. at 979.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 981.
91. Browne states:
Given the undeniable differences between men and women, the nature of sex-
discrimination litigation must change. If the goal is to prevent employers
from improperly discriminating against women, then proof of actual
discrimination should be required. If the true goal is proportional
representation of women at all levels of the work force irrespective of
workforce commitment, then that goal should be candidly acknowledged and
defended on its own terms.
Id. at 1101-02 (citations omitted); Further, Browne suggests that such a defense would be
difficult at best:
Understanding of the origins of observed differences should also affect the
way we evaluate arguments for social change, even if it does not alter our
conclusions. The feminist argument that sex roles are something that society
has imposed upon female victims is inadequate; if current workplace
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As no plaintiff has ever won a gender discrimination case on
the strength of statistical evidence alone, 2 this particular proposal
might well be much ado about nothing. However, as the
evolutionary premises on which the proposal is based may
resurface in the form of other, more immediately important legal
discussions, feminists do well to take them seriously.
Contemporary evolutionists are careful not to conclude that
because psychological gender difference is biologically-based the
difference must necessarily be celebrated. These theorists are
well aware of the "naturalistic fallacy," which holds that because
something is "natural" it is therefore automatically good, and
they 3 generally give lip service to the view that the mere
existence of biologically-based gender differences does not
necessarily imply any moral, political, or legal conclusions. 4
Indeed the evolutionists argue they are not drawing such
conclusions - that they are not saying "men and women are
naturally different, and so we should reinforce those differences
in law." Instead, they make only the empirical assertion that the
facts about men's and women's differences do not dictate social
policy, but nevertheless constrain it.95 Perhaps morality is not
completely dependent on biological facts, they seem to say; but
neither can it be completely independent of those facts. After all,
our morality is a function of the kinds of creatures that we are;
that we are human, and not apes, or fish, or Martians, must
shape our morality and law at some level, must suggest its
possible dimensions, as well as alert us to its limits.6 Evolu-
tionist Robert Wright asks, "Can a Darwinian understanding of
human nature... help in deciding which goals are worthy? That
is, does knowing how evolution has shaped our basic moral
impulses help us decide which impulses we should consider
arrangements are the products of choices made by men and women
predisposed to make choices in a particular way, arguments that society must
remedy the injustice that it has visited on women are based upon an
erroneous premise of societal culpability.
Id. at 1102.
92. See, e.g., KATHARINE BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW 134 (1993) (stating that "sex
discrimination claims based on statistics alone have not succeeded").
93. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 69, at 44.
94. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 75, at 976 (pointing out that "the existence of
[biological gender] differences does not in itself tell us what to do about them."); WRIGHT,
supra note 67 (discussing the naturalistic fallacy).
95. See GOLDsMITH, supra note 69.
96. See, e.g., JEFFRIE MURPHY, EVOLUTION, MORALITY, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 96
(1982) ("I find it inconceivable that there could be no important connections between
morality and the kind of creatures we are.*); id. at 61-68.
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legitimate? The answers, in my opinion, are yes, yes, yes, yes,
and, finally, yes."97 And Kingsley Browne writes:
Our fundamental nature places restrictions on the kinds of
social institutions we are likely to develop and behavior
patterns we are likely to adopt. Matt Ridley has observed
that u[w]e stick to the same monotonously human pattern of
organizing our affairs .... If we were more adventurous
• . .[t]here would be societies in which women killed each
other more often than men, in which old people were
considered more beautiful than twenty-year-olds, in which
wealth did not purchase power over others, in which people
did not discriminate in favor of their own friends and against
strangers, in which parents did not love their own children."
We do not see these patterns in large part for the same
reason that pigs do not fly, ants do not play cribbage, and
hyenas are not warm and loving - such behaviors are simply
not characteristic of the speciesf 8
As the philosopher Elisabeth Lloyd has pointed out,' this line of
thinking does not commit the naturalistic fallacy:
Rather than deriving "ought" from "is" - rather than insisting
on a particular social structure or set of values because they
must be good for us since they evolved through evolution by
natural selection - these authors see our evolution as
defining the shape and limits of possible social structures and
sets of values. The claim about social structures hence
becomes cleanly "scientific" - factual and empirical - rather
than normative. On this approach, sociobiologists are simply
reporting to us, the voting public, what the facts are about
which choices are biologically possible (long term) for us as a
society.'60
In theory this line of thinking not only rescues evolutionary
theory from the naturalistic fallacy, but also insulates it from the
ideological struggle which social policy prescriptions must
normally engage. In Professor Lloyd's words, this "scientific"
evolutionism "places the speakers in a privileged position. They
are not offering opinions about what would be good as 'ordinary
97. WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 10.
98. Browne, supra note 75, at 1102-03 (citations omitted).
99. See Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Sociobiology and Sex Roles (1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Journal of Women and the Law).
100. Id. at 20.
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citizens,' as just another vote among many; they are speaking as
scientific experts about what should be allowed on the ballot at
all."101
As Professor Lloyd points out, however, this evolutionist line
of argument "disregards the fundamental scientific point that
evidence for genetic contribution is not evidence for limits."10 2
Lloyd notes that scientists who make the claim that biologically
wired sex differences affect the possibilities of societal structure
must not only present solid evidence of the sex differences, but
must also present evidence for the limitations they believe exist.10 3
The two kinds of evidence usually presented by these theorists,
evidence of the universality of sex differences and evidence of
brain differences and hormonal differences, are not evidence of
the limits themselves and therefore do not alone support the point
evolutionists seek to make.104
Lloyd gives the following illustration to draw the distinction
between evidence of an existing difference and evidence of the
limits that difference inherently places on possible societal
structures:
Imagine that we living in thirteenth century Europe, and
nearly everyone is unable to read. Furthermore, in all of
human history, nearly everyone has been unable to read.
What conclusion are we justified in drawing from this,
biologically? To conclude that nearly everyone is biologically
unable to read, or even to read easily, would be a mistake.
What would be wrong with such reasoning? We didn't
consider what these same people would have been capable of,
if they had experienced a different environment - one in
which all six-year-olds are routinely taught to read, for
example. In the right environment, nearly everyone is able
to read.1°5
Similarly, Lloyd notes, if we were to study women and men
the world over, we would find that women, on the average, are
shorter than men.106 But this is quite different, as Lloyd
explains, from the claim that women are inherently shorter than
men. Evidence for the first claim, that men are on the average
101. Id. at 21.
102. Id. at 2.
103. See id. at 12.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 14.
106. See id. at 13.
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taller than women, does not, by itself, prove the second claim. In
order to do so, one must know not only what height differences
currently exist or have existed in the past, but what the intrinsic
limits to height are, including such limits under environmental
conditions we have never experienced. 1 7 In fact, notes Lloyd,
"[a]lthough it is widely known that the average overall height of
people has increased in advanced industrial societies over the last
two centuries, it is much less widely advertised that the average
male-female height difference was substantially greater a century
ago than it is today."1°8
Evolutionists cannot escape the force of these objections by
pointing out that sex-based traits and sex roles are fundamentally
different from reading because "sex roles are not simply socially
learned skills, but are rather the natural expression of underlying
psychological dispositions which are not very plastic."109 Professor
Lloyd asserts:
[This is precisely the question at stake. The pressing
question is not whether genetic factors play a role in sex role
behavior-of course they do, just as they are a vital factor in
the ability of six-year-olds to learn to read and enjoy it. The
question is rather whether the expression of genetic
endowment in a more egalitarian environment will lead to a
modified expression of traits.110
Furthermore, explains Elisabeth Lloyd, even if it were
possible to describe a universal set of essential traits possessed by
men and women this does not necessarily mean that these traits
are genetic because adaptive behavior can arise without genetic
involvement."' And even assuming the existence of a human
genetic biogram, it is speculation to assume biogram is adaptive.
Our genetic programming may have arisen under conditions that
had nothing to do with evolutionary theory and natural selection,




108. Id. at 13-14 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 14.
110. Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
111. See id. at 15.
112. See id.
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even if a trait were universal, it is not legitimate to infer, on
that basis alone, that it is genetically based. And, even if it
is genetically based, it is not legitimate to infer, on that basis
alone, that it was actively selected and is an adaptation to
any particular environment, past or present. And finally,
even if the trait is genetically based and was actively select-
ed, it is not legitimate to infer, on that basis alone, that a
different form of the trait could not appear under different
environmental conditions.11 3
In sum, the evolutionary argument for the "naturalness" of
gender differences consists of assertions that such differences
exist, backed up by inferences that are insufficient to prove the
relevance of those differences to social and legal policy. Notice
that to prove their case, evolutionists must not only produce
direct evidence of a biological basis for the gender differences they
observe in humans; they must also, and crucially, demonstrate
that these biologically programmed differences exert a non-trivial
influence on human behavior. They must show, not only the
existence of difference, but also its relative importance, for if such
differences have only a minor or very indirect impact on the
preferences of men and women, those concerned about forming
social policy may safely ignore them. Beyond conclusory
assertions that biology exerts a substantial influence on the
different behaviors of men and women as groups, evolutionists
have offered nothing persuasive on this issue.14
On the other hand, at least some evolutionists themselves do
not doubt that socially generated sex discrimination does continue
to significantly influence the work environment of women.
Professor Browne, for example, acknowledges this view:
It is not my position that biology is the exclusive cause of the
glass ceiling or the gender gap. Indeed, such a claim would
be specious, since all behavior involves the organism's
interaction with its environment. But even beyond this
truism, I do not doubt that some portion of these two
phenomena are produced by social attitudes, some of them
arbitrary, as well as by outright sex discrimination that may
113. Id. at 15-16.
114. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 75, at 1101 (Noting that sex 'differences are produced
in substantial measure by underlying biological differences that were adaptive in our
evolutionary history").
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be based upon false assumptions about the relative capacities
of the sexes. 1 5
In support of the claim that invidious discrimination exerts a
large influence on women's job aspirations, recent feminist
scholarship has shown that the goals and performance of female
employees are dramatically affected by the attitudes toward
women these employees encounter in the workplace.116 In her
analysis of Title VII cases raising the "lack of interest" defense to
claims of discrimination, Vicki Schultz invokes a rich body of
sociological research demonstrating that women's career goals,
and the importance women assign to their work, are directly and
positively related to the employers' affirmative efforts to make
opportunities available to them." 7  Indeed, writes Schultz,
"women's work preferences are formed, created, and recreated in
response to changing work conditions."1"8 Schultz draws on
studies showing that "contrary to the conventional wisdom, sex
segregation does not persist because women's commitment to the
family leads them to 'choose' to consign themselves to lower-paid,
female-dominated occupations."' 19 Instead, women (and men)
tailor their commitment to work to the internal environment of
the workplace. Women who worked in traditionally "female" jobs
with little opportunity for advancement tended to behave in
stereotypically "feminine" ways and to possess stereotypical
attitudes toward the importance of work. 120 Schultz points out
that "[w]ithin firms, jobs are highly segregated by sex. Female-
dominated jobs tend to be on distinct promotional ladders that
offer far less opportunity for advancement than do those for male-
dominated jobs."121
Schultz cites Rosabeth Moss Kanter's study of secretaries in
a major industrial corporation as a dramatic illustration of this
point:
With little opportunity for advancement at all, and no chance
to move to the managerial track, [t]he corporation's
115. Browne, supra note 76, at 984.
116. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1749 (1990).
117. Id. at 1825.
118. Id. at 1815.
119. Id. at 1820.
120. Id. at 1827-28 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 1827.
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secretaries tended to display work attitudes and behaviors
that are commonly perceived to be attributes of "femininity."
Many were narrowly devoted to their individual bosses, timid
and self-effacing, dependent on praise, and given to
emotionality and gossip. But it was their position within the
organization and the structure of incentives attached to their
jobs that led them to develop these orientations. To be good
secretaries, they were required to display the ufeminine"
behaviors that are commonly viewed as an extension of
women's intrinsic personalities. 122
Professor Schultz reports that "[]ike the blue-collar men studied
by an earlier generation of sociologists, Kanter's secretaries
adjusted to their realistically nonexistent possibility of
advancement by rating the desirability of promotion relatively
low."123
By contrast, women who began their working lives in
traditionally "female" jobs but who crossed the sex line to work
in traditionally male jobs demonstrated quite different attitudes
toward work and promotion. Schultz writes:
Once they began doing nontraditional [blue-collar] jobs, these
women became highly motivated workers who defined work
as a central life interest and who valued the intrinsic aspects
of their work. Although many of the women had originally
moved into nontraditional work because they needed the
money, the job quickly became more than a paycheck. The
women in Walshok's study valued four things most highly
about their work: (1) productivity, or "a feeling of having done
something constructive, of having accomplished something
with one's time;" (2) challenge, or "a new or unusual
experience, that requires a woman to stretch herself, to reach,
to grow;" (3) autonomy, or the opportunity to work
independently and to exercise discretion about how to control
the timing and sequencing of one's work; and (4) relatedness,
or "feeling as if one's 'in the swim of things', in the
'mainstream' of life." 124
122. Id. at 1828.
123. Id. at 1827-28 (reporting that "[w]omen in low-mobility . . . situations develop
attitudes and orientations that are sometimes said to be characteristic of those people as
individuals or 'women as a group,' but that can more profitably be viewed as universal
human responses to blocked opportunities") (citing ROsABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 159 (1977)); see also id. at 1829.
124. Id. at 1830.
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Many such women first moved into traditionally male jobs only
after employers sent out clear signals that they were looking to
hire women in these areas. 1' For these women, the employer's
newly welcoming attitude caused a change in their own
perceptions of what was possible, leading directly to their move
out of traditional female jobs and toward a greater commitment
to public-sphere work.
Evolutionists might argue that, whatever the impact of a
greater opportunity on women's attitudes toward work and their
job performance, women as a group will always lag behind men
as long as competitiveness, risk-taking, and desire for resource
acquisition remain major determinants of workplace success.
This bare assertion, however, can draw no support from the
current gap in men's and women's performance. In Elizabeth
Lloyd's terms, this is an argument about limits, specifically the
limits that biologically programmed preferences place on women's
drive for public-sphere success. In light of the demonstrated
power that workplace environment has on women's goals, as well
as the continued presence of employer sex discrimination against
women (a factor that is admitted by at least some evolutionists),
the burden of proof correctly remains on those who would assert
"natural difference" to demonstrate scientifically those limits. In
the absence of such a demonstration, theories of "natural" gender
difference appear to be rooted not in hard scientific fact but
ideological - and therefore politically contestable - conviction.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE
It is surely no coincidence that the neoevolutionary account
of women's difference lends support to the most traditionally
conservative views of women's proper "place." Patricia Williams's
point is that, until we can change our need to construct
hierarchies based on group differences, theories of "natural"
difference - however deeply we suppress them - will continue to
discover new routes to the surface of political debate. Anti-racist
and anti-sexist laws that result from a real change of heart might
work; laws intended as substitutes for such a change will not.
Although The Rooster's Egg is not primarily a "law" book, its
relative lack of emphasis on legal reforms reflects the author's
belief that we cannot rely only on formal changes in the law, but
must instead inaugurate a national discussion about race, gender,
125..Id. at 1829-30.
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and class which will involve face-to-face communication about
difference and its implications. Williams relies enormously on the
power of empathy, on the ability of all citizens not only to present
their own views but also to listen with open hearts to the very
different views of others whom they may have been taught to
hate or mistrust. I must admit to being skeptical about the
transformative power of communitarian dialogue. In insisting on
its value, however, Professor Williams effectively conveys both her
frustration at the failure of legal reform to end group-based
bigotry and her fundamental optimism about the power of
communication, when empathically offered and received, to help
us to work together despite profound, enduring, and perhaps even
permanent differences.
